This paper investigates COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING with local ADVERTISING options in a channel with three players including a manufacturer and two retailers. The current study applied the COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING literature to a case with two options for local ADVERTISING investment. To this end, this paper compared two cases of the presence and absence of COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING, which has almost been neglected in the COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING literature. The objective of this study is to determine the equilibrium strategy of the retailers' ADVERTISING options, players' ADVERTISING expenditures, and manufacturers' participation rates on retailers' investment. The aforementioned problem was analyzed as a three-stage game using backward induction. In the fi, rst and second stages, ADVERTISING investments of players were analytically determined. In the third stage, the Nash equilibrium pair of ADVERTISING options was found through numerical studies. The problem was solved by illustrative examples in two cases of the presence and absence of the COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING contract. Finally, the conditions for which offering the contract was win-win for all players were identified. Sensitivity analysis was carried out to explain the efficacy of the model.

This paper considers the issue of COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING with local ADVERTISING options in a channel with three players, including a manufacturer and two retailers. The current study, expands the COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING literature to a case where there exist two options for local ADVERTISING investment. Moreover, this paper compares two cases of presence and absence of COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING, which has almost been neglected in COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING literature. The purpose is to determine equilibrium strategy of retailers’ ADVERTISING options, players’ ADVERTISING expenditures and the manufacturer’ participation rates on retailers’ investment. The aforementioned problem is analyzed as a three-stage game, using backward induction. In the first and second stages, ADVERTISING investments of players are determined analytically. Then, in the third stage, the Nash equilibrium pair of ADVERTISING options can be found using numerical study. The problem is solved using illustrative examples in two cases of presence and absence of the COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING contract. Finally, the conditions for which offering the contract is win-win for all players, are identified. A Sensitivity analysis has been carried out to explain the efficacy of the model.

This work considers COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain. While the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, the retailer is the follower. Using Sethi model it models the dynamic effect of the manufacturer and retailer’s ADVERTISING efforts on sale. It uses optimal control technique and stochastic differential game theory to obtain the players’ ADVERTISING strategies and the long-run value of the awareness share. Further, it models the relationship between the payoffs of both players and the awareness share. The work shows that with the provision of subsidy the retail ADVERTISING effort increases while the manufacturer’s ADVERTISING effort reduces. It further shows that the total channel payoff is higher for subsidised retail ADVERTISING. However, the subsidy can only be possible if the rate of growth of the manufacturer’s payoff is twice higher than that of the retailer.

COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING is a cost-sharing mechanism in which a part of retailers' ADVERTISING investments are financed by the manufacturers. In recent years, investment among ADVERTISING options has become a difficult marketing issue. In this paper, the COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING problem with ADVERTISING options is investigated in a two-period horizon in which the market share in the second period depends on the decisions made in the first period. The problem is solved for two cases of the absence and presence of COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING contract, and the results are compared. The solution to the problem is presented using the concepts of the Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg game, stochastic games, and dynamic programming. The computational results using numerical examples show that if the COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING contract is offered in the win-win condition, the players’ profit will increase significantly.

Nowadays, coordination between members in a supply chain has become very important and beneficial to channel members. Through COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING, manufacturers and retailers can jointly participate in promotional programs. This action not only reduces the cost of ADVERTISING, but also is important to create a link with local retailers in order to increase immediate sales at the retail level. In this article, the problem of COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING and pricing decisions in a multi-product manufacturer-retailer (oligopoly market) supply chain is investigated. Stackelberg game with leadership of the manufacturer is proposed to model the problem. In order to find optimal prices and ADVERTISING expenditure, the bi-level programming approach is implemented. Solutions for the first level are determined by a genetic algorithm and best responses of retailers to the generated solutions of the manufacturer are calculated by CPLEX. Finally, numerical experiments and sensitivity analysis are conducted in order to assess the efficiency of models and solution procedures. Results show that competition will lead to a lower retail price, which is preferable from the consumers’ point of view. Also, profit of the manufacturer and retailers will decrease if competition effect increases.

During the past few decades, there have been tremendous efforts in COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING. In spite of many practical applications in real life, cooperation in ADVERTISING and pricing strategies in a one-manufacturer and multi-retailer supply chain is almost overlooked in the literature. Hence, this paper seeks to investigate optimum co-op ADVERTISING and pricing decisions in a B2B relationship for a supply chain consist of a manufacturer and numerous multiple retailers in Iran as a case study. This paper introduces a game theoretic model containing pricing and COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING in a one-manufacturer and multi-retailer structure. Non-COOPERATIVE and COOPERATIVE game structures are used for analyzing the proposed model. The non-COOPERATIVE game structure uses Stackelberg game among the echelons and Nash game in the retailer echelon. Motivated by a real case study including an Iranian supply chain data of one manufacturer and 150 retailers, a novel model proposed to tackle the similar condition occurred in real life. The results indicate that the manufacturer prefers to suggest higher participation rate to smaller retailers. Sensitivity analysis is presented, and some managerial insights are finally derived from the results.

This work deals with subsidy transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer through the distributor in COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING. While the retailer engages in local ADVERTISING, the manufacturer indirectly participates in retail ADVERTISING using ADVERTISING subsidy which is given to the distributor, who in turn transfers it to the retailer. The manufacturer is the Stackelberg game leader; the distributor is the first follower, while the retailer is the last follower. The work employs differential game in modelling the effect of subsidy on the individual and channel payoffs; and models the awareness share dynamics using Sethi’ s sales-ADVERTISING model. It obtains Stackelberg equilibriums characterising four-game scenario: no subsidy from neither the manufacturer nor the distributor; withholding of manufacturer’ s subsidy by the distributor; provision of subsidy by the distributor in the absence of the manufacturer’ s participation; and the participation of both the manufacturer and distributor in retail ADVERTISING. It shows that in the absence of subsidy from the manufacturer, the distributor should intervene by providing subsidy to the retailer. However, if this is impossible, he should avoid withholding the subsidy meant for retail ADVERTISING. The players’ payoffs as well as the channel payoff are worst with non-participation of both the manufacturer and the distributor, and best with transfer of subsidy.

This paper proposes a new motivation forinformation sharing in a decentralized channel consistingof a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. Themanufacturer provides a common product to the retailers atthe same wholesale price. Both retailers add their ownvalues to the product and distribute it to consumers. Factorssuch as retail prices, values added to the product, and localADVERTISING of the retailers simultaneously have effect onmarket demand. Each retailer has full information aboutthe own added value which is unknown to the manufacturerand other retailer. The manufacturer uses a COOPERATIVEADVERTISING program for motivating the retailers to disclosetheir private information. A numerical study is presented tocompare different scenarios of information sharing. Computationalresults show that there is a condition in whichfull information sharing is beneficial for all members of thesupply chain through COOPERATIVE ADVERTISING program and, therefore, retailers have enough incentive to disclose theircost information to the manufacturer.